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Triggering the Right to Counsel: 
“Detention” and  
Section 10 of the Charter 
Steven Penney* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 10(b) is one of the most important ― and most frequently 
litigated ― legal rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 
Its language is deceptively simple: “[e]veryone has the right on arrest or 
detention . . . to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be 
informed of that right . . .”. From this single sentence, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has over the past 25 years constructed an elaborate 
regulatory scheme that, broadly speaking, requires police to provide 
suspects with: (i) detailed, practical information about their rights and how 
they can effectively exercise them; and (ii) a reasonable opportunity to 
talk to a lawyer, should they express a desire to do so.2 Police are not 
required to do any of these things, however, for suspects who have not been 
either arrested or detained. It is thus crucial for police and courts to have 
clear and sensible understanding of the meaning of arrest and detention. 
Arrest is almost always straightforward. In the vast majority of cases, 
it will be obvious whether a person is arrested.3 Arrestees, moreover, 
must always be afforded the right to counsel. Unfortunately, the issue of 
detention is not nearly as simple. The reason for this is twofold. First, 
the courts have defined detention in a highly variable fashion. As 
discussed in detail below, individuals may in some cases be detained 
                                                                                                            
*
 Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. 
1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
2
 See Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of 
Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era ― Part II: Self-Incrimination in Police Investigations” 
(2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280, at 307-11. 
3
 See, generally, R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, at paras. 24-25 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Whitfield, [1969] S.C.J. No. 66, [1970] S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.); James Stribopoulos, 
“Unchecked Power: The Constitutional Regulation of Arrest Reconsidered” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 225,  
at 230-32. 
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even though they are neither physically restrained nor legally obliged to 
cooperate with the authorities. In other situations, conversely, persons 
may not be detained despite the fact that their liberty is obviously 
restrained or they are involuntarily subjected to questioning or searches. 
Second, courts have recognized a number of situations where detainees 
may be denied their right to counsel under section 10(b). As we will see, 
this has been accomplished either by interpreting the right restrictively 
or by justifying its infringement under section 1 of the Charter. 
For the most part, the courts are not to be blamed for this state of 
affairs. Like most Charter provisions, section 10(b) is concise. It is not a 
detailed regulatory code. It must nonetheless be interpreted and applied 
in disparate circumstances. Courts have accordingly found creative ways 
of reconciling its plain meaning with the exigencies of police questioning. 
They can be criticized, however, for failing to provide good answers to 
two important questions:  
(1) In what circumstances does a detention arise when a suspect is neither 
physically restrained nor under a legal duty to comply with police?  
(2) Must police comply with section 10(b) in exercising their power of 
investigative detention? 
These failures stem, at least in part, from a reluctance to interpret 
section 10(b) in light of the pragmatic realities of police questioning. For 
the Supreme Court, the purpose of the right to counsel is to give criminal 
suspects a fair opportunity to exercise their right to silence and refrain 
from incriminating themselves. While this interpretation is intuitively 
appealing (lawyers advise their clients to remain silent, after all), it is 
largely misguided. Section 10(b)’s main purpose is to help deter abusive 
interrogation practices, including those apt to produce false confessions. 
If more attention were paid to his objective, it would be easier to craft 
bright-line rules dictating when section 10(b) applies and when it does 
not. This approach would also achieve a more optimal accommodation 
between the police’s need to obtain reliable evidence and suspects’ 
interests in avoiding inhumane treatment and wrongful convictions. 
This argument will proceed as follows: Part II details the Supreme 
Court’s general approach to detention under section 10 of the Charter; 
Part III further examines and critiques its interpretation of the purpose of 
the right to counsel; Part IV looks at the case law on the three types of 
detention (legal psychological restraint, non-legal psychological restraint 
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and physical restraint) and makes suggestions for reform; and Part V 
concludes. 
II. THE GENERAL APPROACH TO DETENTION 
The Supreme Court of Canada set out the general test for detention 
under section 10 of the Charter very early on. In Therens,4 it considered 
whether a driver required to participate in a roadside alcohol screening 
test was detained within the meaning of section 10.5 The Court had 
previously held that such demands did not trigger a detention under 
section 2(c)(ii) of the Canadian Bill of Rights,6 which provides the 
“right to retain and instruct counsel without delay” to persons “arrested 
or detained”.7 The fact that it is an offence to refuse to comply did not 
mean that persons subject to the demand were legally detained.8 Detention, 
the Court concluded, is limited to situations of “actual physical restraint”.9 
This reasoning was rejected by Le Dain J. in Therens,10 who viewed 
detention under section 10 of the Charter in much broader terms. In 
addition to physical constraint, he asserted, a detention also arises when 
police assume “control over the movement of a person by a demand or 
direction which may have significant legal consequence and which 
prevents or impedes access to counsel”.11 Though this would have been 
enough to dispose of the appeal, Le Dain J. went a step further, holding 
that a detention may sometimes arise even when there is neither physical 
restraint nor “criminal liability for failure to comply” with a legal duty.12 
He explained: 
[I]t is not realistic, as a general rule, to regard compliance with a 
demand or direction by a police officer as truly voluntary, in the sense 
that the citizen feels that he or she has the choice to obey or not. . . . 
                                                                                                            
4
 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). 
5
 See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 254. 
6
 S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
7
 R. v. Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471 (S.C.C.). 
8
 R. v. Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471, at 478 (S.C.C.). 
9
 R. v. Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471, at 478 (S.C.C.). 
10
 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). 
11
 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 642 (S.C.C.), Le Dain J., 
dissenting (on other grounds). All eight judges in Therens agreed that the accused was detained, 
however only three others expressly adopted Le Dain J.’s reasoning. Justice Le Dain’s approach in 
Therens was endorsed by a unanimous court, however, in R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, 
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 649 (S.C.C.). 
12
 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 644 (S.C.C.). 
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Most citizens are not aware of the precise legal limits of police authority. 
Rather than risk the application of physical force or prosecution for 
wilful obstruction, the reasonable person is likely to err on the side of 
caution, assume lawful authority and comply with the demand. The 
element of psychological compulsion, in the form of a reasonable 
perception of suspension of freedom of choice, is enough to make the 
restraint of liberty involuntary. Detention may be effected without the 
application or threat of application of physical restraint if the person 
concerned submits or acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and 
reasonably believes that the choice to do otherwise does not exist.13 
To summarize, a detention occurs when police either physically or 
psychologically restrain suspects in situations where they might require 
access to counsel.14 The category of psychological restraint may be further 
subdivided into two types: (i) situations where suspects face legal liability 
for refusing to comply with police directives; and (ii) situations where, 
despite the absence of such liability, they reasonably believe that 
compliance is mandatory.15 As discussed below, each of these types has 
generated interpretive challenges. Before examining this doctrine, however, 
it will be useful to further examine the purpose of the constitutional right 
to counsel. 
III. THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 10(b) 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s understanding of the purpose of the 
right to counsel in section 10(b) is best expressed as follows: 
 The purpose of the right . . . is to provide detainees with an 
opportunity to be informed of their rights and obligations under the 
law and, most importantly, to obtain advice on how to exercise those 
rights and fulfil those obligations . . . . This opportunity is made 
available because, when an individual is detained by state authorities, 
he or she is put in a position of disadvantage relative to the state. Not 
only has this person suffered a deprivation of liberty, but also this 
person may be at risk of incriminating him- or herself. Accordingly, a 
person who is “detained” within the meaning of s. 10 of the Charter is 
in immediate need of legal advice in order to protect his or her right 
                                                                                                            
13
 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 644 (S.C.C.). 
14
 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 641-42 (S.C.C.), Le Dain J., 
dissenting; R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 648-49 (S.C.C.). 
15
 See R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 642-44 (S.C.C.),  
Le Dain J., dissenting; R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 649 (S.C.C.). 
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against self-incrimination and to assist him or her in regaining his or 
her liberty. . . . [T]he right to counsel . . . is designed to ensure that 
persons who are arrested or detained are treated fairly in the criminal 
process.16 
This statement is fine as far as it goes. Like its progenitor ― the 
Miranda17 warning ― section 10(b) of the Charter does help to prevent 
self-incrimination and mitigate the disadvantage that suspects face in 
confrontations with police. But neither Miranda nor section 10(b) forbid 
self-incrimination; nor do they prohibit police from pressuring suspects 
to speak.18 Section 10(b) requires that detainees be informed of their 
rights; it does not demand that they talk to a lawyer.19 Indeed, detainees 
very frequently decline the opportunity to talk to a lawyer, and many 
(irrationally) choose to make incriminating statements.20 The Supreme 
Court of Canada has held that they are free to do so as long as they 
demonstrate a “limited cognitive capacity to understand the process and 
communicate with counsel”.21 Suspects need not be capable of exercising 
“analytical reasoning” or making a decision that “best serves [their] 
interests”.22 
Detainees who invoke their right to counsel, moreover, need only be 
given a “reasonable opportunity” to do so.23 There is no requirement that 
they actually talk to a lawyer. And once detainees have been given this 
opportunity, police are permitted to convince detainees to disregard their 
lawyer’s advice, so long as they are not unduly persistent and do not 
denigrate the integrity of counsel.24 
                                                                                                            
16
 R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at 191 (S.C.C.). 
17
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 444 (1966) (a person subject to custodial 
interrogation must be warned “that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make 
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either 
retained or appointed”). 
18
 See Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of 
Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era — Part II: Self-Incrimination in Police Investigations” 
(2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280; Steven Penney, “Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View” 
(1998) 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 309. 
19
 See R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233 (S.C.C.). 
20
 See Joseph R. Grano, “Introduction ― The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure: The Contribution of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Policy” 
(1989) 22 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 395, at 406-408; Louis Michael Seidman, “Rubashov’s Question:  
Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences” (1990) 2 Yale J.L. & Human. 149, at 165. 
21
 R. v. Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, at 933 (S.C.C.). 
22
 R. v. Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, at 933-34, 941-42 (S.C.C.). 
23
 R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233 (S.C.C.). 
24
 See R. v. Burlingham, [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206, at para. 13 (S.C.C.);  
R. v. Gormley, [1999] P.E.I.J. No. 80, 140 C.C.C. (3d) 110 (P.E.I.S.C.(A.D.)) (police permitted to 
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The limited protection offered by section 10(b) against self-
incrimination can be seen even more plainly in the Supreme Court’s 
approach to the compulsory taking of bodily substances. The Court has 
maintained that such takings involve self-incrimination,25 and held that 
police must comply with section 10(b) before obtaining samples to use 
as evidence at trial.26 So long as police comply with the sampling power’s 
procedural requirements, however, suspects have no right to refuse to 
cooperate. Giving them a right to talk to a lawyer thus does very little to 
prevent self-incrimination. 
If section 10’s effect in preventing self-incrimination is so limited, 
what is its point? The answer is buried beneath the Court’s cryptic reference 
in Bartle27 to ensuring “fair treatment” and rectifying the “disadvantage” 
that suspects face vis-à-vis police.28 As with the Miranda29 rule, section 
10’s main purpose is to deter investigative techniques that are either 
inherently abusive or apt to produce false confessions.30 Police are most 
likely to use such methods against suspects who are reluctant to speak. 
The section 10(b) caution proclaims or reinforces the notion (in the 
minds of both suspects and police) that suspects are not required to 
cooperate with police.31 
                                                                                                            
question suspect for almost four hours despite suspect repeatedly refusing to answer questions on 
the basis that his lawyer told him to remain silent); R. v. Roper, [1997] O.J. No. 305, 98 O.A.C. 225 
(Ont. C.A.) (police permitted to continue questioning of suspect after he consulted counsel and 
counsel advised police that the suspect intended to exercise his right to silence); R. v. Kerr, [2000] 
B.C.J. No. 611, 32 C.R. (5th) 359 (B.C.C.A.) (same); R. v. Mayo, [1999] O.J. No. 714, 133 C.C.C. 
(3d) 168 (Ont. C.A.) (police permitted to question suspect after he had talked to a lawyer despite his 
insistence that he did not want to talk in absence of counsel); R. v. Ekman, [2000] B.C.J. No. 1363, 
146 C.C.C. (3d) 346 (B.C.C.A.) (same); R. v. Friesen, [1995] A.J. No. 770, 101 C.C.C. (3d) 167 
(Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal denied, [1995] S.C.C.A. No. 539 (S.C.C.) (police permitted to question 
accused after he had talked to a lawyer); R. v. Russell, [1998] A.J. No. 569, 62 Alta. L.R. (3d) 87 
(Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 363 (S.C.C.) (same); R. v. Plata, [1999] 
J.Q. no 586, 136 C.C.C. (3d) 436 (Que. C.A.) (same). See also R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 
2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.) (no violation of s. 7 right to silence when police continued questioning 
despite accused asserting 18 times that he did not wish to speak).  
25
 See R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, at paras. 80-89 (S.C.C.). 
26
 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). 
27
 R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.). 
28
 R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at 191 (S.C.C). 
29
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
30
 See Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of 
Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era — Part II: Self-Incrimination in Police Investigations” 
(2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280, at 312-21. 
31
 See Richard Leo, “The Impact of Miranda Revisited” (1996) 86 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 621, at 679. 
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By setting out bright-line rules for police, section 10(b) also avoids 
the ambiguity inherent in the voluntary confession rule, which is the 
other chief limitation on official questioning. If a suspect can show that 
police did not issue a proper caution or did not comply with a request to 
talk to a lawyer, any ensuing confession will likely be excluded whether 
or not there is evidence of actual coercion. Section 10 therefore reduces 
the likelihood that police will employ abusive tactics to induce confessions 
from contumacious suspects.32 In the course of examining the jurisprudence 
on the three categories of section 10 detention (legal psychological restraint, 
non-legal psychological restraint and physical restraint), I make suggestions 
for reform to better achieve this objective. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DETENTION JURISPRUDENCE 
1. Legal Psychological Restraint 
The Supreme Court concluded in Therens33 and Thomsen34 that 
drivers subjected to breath sample demands are detained within the 
meaning of section 10 of the Charter. The Court later held that a detention 
occurs when vehicles are stopped for any purpose.35 It has also found, 
however, that police need not comply with section 10(b) in exercising 
powers to briefly detain motorists to investigate driving-related offences. 
Specifically, the right to counsel may be denied to drivers subject to 
breath alcohol screening demands,36 asked questions about their alcohol 
                                                                                                            
32
 This is not to say that the Supreme Court’s s. 10(b) doctrine does as much as it could to 
achieve this objective. See Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward 
Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era — Part II: Self-Incrimination in Police 
Investigations” (2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280, at 312-21. 
33
 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). 
34
 R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C). 
35
 R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 31 (S.C.C.). 
See also R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.) (stopping of vehicles a 
detention within the meaning of s. 9 of the Charter); R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 
32, at para. 66 (S.C.C.), Binnie J., concurring (same). These detentions presumably fall under the 
“legal psychological” category as provincial highway traffic statutes typically make it an offence for a 
driver to fail to stop when directed to do so by police. See, e.g., Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000,  
c. T-6, ss. 157 and 166; Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 216.  
36
 R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 650-56 (S.C.C.). Section 254(2) 
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 permits police, on the basis of reasonable suspicion, to 
demand that a motorist provide a sample of breath for analysis by an approved screening device 
(“ASD”). To be legally effective and constitutionally sound, this demand must generally be made 
immediately, i.e., before there is a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel. A positive result does 
not prove liability, but will typically give police the reasonable and probable grounds they require 
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consumption37 or asked to perform physical sobriety tests.38 Such 
limitations on the right to counsel are justified under section 1 of the 
Charter. 
To justify a prima facie infringement of a Charter right, the Crown 
must show that the limitation is both “prescribed by law” and “reasonable 
. . . in a free and democratic society”. It will be prescribed by law if it 
“is expressly provided for by statute”, arises by “necessary implication 
from the terms of a statute or from its operating requirements” or results 
from the “application of a common law rule”.39 In Thomsen,40 the Court 
held that denying the right to counsel during roadside alcohol screening 
tests is both “prescribed by law” (because the denial arises by necessary 
implication from the Criminal Code’s41 alcohol testing regime) and 
“reasonable” (because conferring a right to counsel at this stage would 
unduly diminish the deterrence of impaired driving).42 For the same 
reasons, the denial of the right to counsel to drivers questioned about 
their alcohol consumption or asked to perform physical sobriety tests 
was upheld in Orbanski; Elias.43 
These cases raise questions about reading in limits to the right to 
counsel that are not expressly set out in legislation.44 But the underlying 
policy question should not be controversial. Had the Court held in 
                                                                                                            
to demand a breathalyzer sample, which precisely determines the alcohol concentration in a person’s 
blood. See Criminal Code, s. 254(3); R. v. Woods, [2005] S.C.J. No. 42, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 205, at paras. 
13-15, 30-32, 43-44 (S.C.C.); R. v. Latour, [1997] O.J. No. 2445, 116 C.C.C. (3d) 279 (Ont. C.A.). 
37
 R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 54-60 (S.C.C.). 
Police do not have the power to compel motorists to answer questions or perform sobriety tests. 
They must therefore seek motorists’ voluntary cooperation. However, as mentioned in footnote 35, 
they do have the power to stop motorists to seek their cooperation, and this stopping power is a 
form of legal psychological detention. 
38
 R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). See also 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) does not 
apply to motorists subject to brief roadside questioning as such questioning does not constitute 
“custodial interrogation”). 
39
 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 645 (S.C.C.). See also 
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 [RWDSU] v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 
[1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 599 (S.C.C.) (Charter applies to the common law). 
40
 R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.). 
41
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
42
 R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 650-56 (S.C.C.). See also 
R. v. Grant, [1991] S.C.J. No. 78, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.). 
43
 R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 54-60 (S.C.C.). 
44
 This issue was the focus of the debate between the majority and minority concurring 
reasons in R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). See also 
Tim Quigley, “Annotation: R. v. Orbanski” (2005) 29 C.R. (6th) 205; Don Stuart, Charter Justice 
in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 303-304. 
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Thomsen45 or Orbanski; Elias46 that the police’s failure to comply with 
section 10(b) was not “prescribed by law”, the provinces would have 
responded with legislation specifically authorizing the infringement, and 
the courts would have found it to be a reasonable limitation under 
section 1 of the Charter.47 The reason for this is simple: complying with 
section 10(b) in these circumstances would prolong suspects’ detention 
and frustrate the investigative process; yet it would do little to advance 
the objectives of the right. In the case of ASD demands, so long as 
police follow the rules, suspects must either provide a breath sample or 
risk criminal punishment for refusing to do so. In the vast majority of 
cases, talking to a lawyer does not alter this situation. 
More importantly, providing a right to counsel at this point would 
do little to deter abusive interrogation practices. Brief roadside questioning 
is not likely to involve cruel interrogation methods or generate false 
confessions.48 As the United States Supreme Court observed in Berkemer,49 
the brevity and public nature of most traffic stops substantially mitigate 
the risk of overreaching. 
The situation is different for breathalyzer tests. These are usually 
carried out at the police station and may involve a detention lasting 
several hours. As with roadside screening tests, talking to a lawyer will 
rarely prevent the compulsion of incriminating bodily substances. But  
                                                                                                            
45
 R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.). 
46
 R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
47
 In fact most provinces now have legislation that does specifically authorize police to 
stop, detain, and conduct inquiries of motorists in the course of driving-related investigations. See, 
e.g., Highway Traffic Act, C.C.S.M. c. H60, s. 76.1(1); Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8,  
s. 48(1). 
48
 This is not to say that the courts have entirely ignored the issue of self-incrimination in 
the context of roadside detentions. The Supreme Court suggested in R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 58-59 (S.C.C.), that, as a result of concerns over 
compelled self-incrimination, the violation of s. 10(b) during roadside detentions might not be 
justified if the Crown attempted to prove impairment by adducing evidence created by the accused, 
such as the results of ASD tests and answers to questions about consumption. See also R. v. Milne, 
[1996] O.J. No. 1728, 107 C.C.C. (3d) 118, at 121 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Coutts, [1999] O.J. No. 2013, 
136 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at paras. 15-18 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. 
(3d) 27, at para. 61 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.). This 
position is curious. If evidence created by drivers during roadside detentions is admissible for the 
purpose of demonstrating the existence of reasonable and probable grounds (which it is), and such 
grounds provide the basis for breathalyzer demands (the results of which are admissible), then this 
evidence must be “self-incriminating” in any realistic sense of the phrase. It is thus difficult to 
understand why evidence collected from drivers during roadside detentions should not be 
admissible to prove impairment; or, putting the same point slightly differently, why s. 1 of the Charter 
justifies denying the right to counsel when such evidence is admitted to establish grounds for the 
breathalyzer demand on the voir dire but not when it is admitted to prove impairment at trial. 
49
 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, at 438-39 (1984). 
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as in other custodial settings, the caution may help to deter abusive 
questioning practices. Complying with section 10(b) in these circumstances, 
moreover, is not likely to either substantially prolong the detention or 
detract from the police’s ability to obtain reliable evidence of guilt. The 
Therens50 Court thus rightly concluded that drivers subject to breathalyzer 
demands must be informed of their right to counsel under s. 10(b).51 
The Court has taken a different approach in the customs and 
immigration context. Customs officials have broad powers to detain, 
search and question people entering and leaving Canada.52 As in the case 
of vehicle stops, failure to cooperate constitutes an offence.53 The Court 
has found, however, that people subject to routine questioning and searches 
at border crossings are not detained within the meaning of section 10(b).54 
Detention arises only when people are suspected of having committed 
an offence and subjected to lengthier and more intrusive inquiries.55 
While this approach has been rightly criticized for stretching the 
plain meaning of “detention” beyond its breaking point,56 the Court could 
have reached the same result under section 1 of the Charter. As with 
roadside detentions, there is little to be gained (and much to be lost) in 
providing the right to counsel to people subject to preliminary, routine 
inquiries at border crossings. 
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 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). 
51
 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. 
Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 57 (S.C.C.) (“there is no 
question that the motorist who is not allowed to continue on his way but, rather, is requested to 
provide a breath or blood sample, is entitled to the full protection of the Charter right to counsel”). 
See also R. v. Woods, [2005] S.C.J. No. 42, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 205, at paras. 35-36 (S.C.C.).  
52
 See Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), ss. 98, 99.1-99.3; Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 16.  
53
 See Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 153.1; Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 127, 128. 
54
 See R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 (S.C.C.); R. v. Jacoy, 
[1988] S.C.J. No. 83, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548 (S.C.C.); Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration), [1993] S.C.J. No. 38, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Vandenbosch, 
[2007] M.J. No. 346 (Man. C.A.) (applying customs detention jurisprudence to prison visitors). 
55
 See R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495, at 521 (S.C.C.) (detention 
arose when suspect strip searched); R. v. Jacoy, [1988] S.C.J. No. 83, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548, at 557-58 
(S.C.C.) (detention arose when decision made to strip search suspect if necessary). 
56
 See Eric Colvin & Tim Quigley, “Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure: The 
1988-89 Term” (1990) 1 S.C.L.R (2d) 187, at 224-25; Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian 
Criminal Law, 2d ed., looseleaf (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) at § 5.3(c)(i). 
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2. Non-legal Psychological Restraint 
The second category of psychological detention ― situations where 
people reasonably believe that they must cooperate with police ― is 
more perplexing. In some circumstances people are “detained” under 
section 10 even though their liberty is not limited by law. Despite their 
(reasonable) belief that they must comply with police requests, in other 
words, they have no legal obligation to do so. This situation almost always 
arises in the context of police questioning. With few exceptions, while 
police are free to question criminal suspects, suspects are not required to 
answer.57 
How have we arrived at this paradoxical situation? We can imagine 
a legal regime that would clarify whether people approached by authorities 
must cooperate. Before questioning, for example, police could be required 
to tell people that they are either: (i) being detained under law for a 
particular purpose (with an explanation as to what they are legally 
obliged to do and what they are free to refuse to do); or (ii) not detained 
under law and are free to refuse any requests.58 But for better or worse, 
Parliament and the courts have sanctioned a much murkier regime. In 
many situations, police may approach people and ask them questions 
without informing them of their legal status. 
Given this legal milieu, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court 
has recognized that people often (reasonably but mistakenly) assume 
that they must comply with police requests.59 Nor is it surprising, given 
the imbalance of power and potential for abuse inhering in such situations, 
that the Court has found that the protections of section 10 of the Charter 
should be afforded to some suspects who are not actually “detained” in 
the strict legal sense of the word. That said, it is neither necessary nor 
desirable to caution all persons questioned by police.60 Unfortunately, 
there is no obvious way to decide when section 10 should apply and when 
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 See, generally, Ed Ratushny, Self-incrimination in the Canadian Criminal Process 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1979), at 185-86. 
58
 See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Arrest (Report 29) at 20 (Ottawa: The 
Commission, 1986); Stephen Coughlan, “Police Detention for Questioning: A Proposal” (1986)  
28 Crim. L.Q. 64 and 170; Alan D. Gold, “Perspectives on Section 10(b): The Right to Counsel 
under the Charter” (1993) 22 C.R. (4th) 370, at 374. 
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 See R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). 
60
 See R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 19 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Grafe, [1987] O.J. No. 796, 60 C.R. (3d) 242 (Ont. C.A.); United States of America v. Alfaro, 
[1992] J.Q. no 831, 75 C.C.C. (3d) 211, at 236 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Elshaw, [1991] S.C.J. No. 68, [1991]  
3 S.C.R. 24, at 53-70, L’Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting. 
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it should not.61 The Supreme Court’s “reasonable belief” test provides 
only limited guidance. 
The lower courts have adopted a variety of approaches. For some, 
detention under section 10 arises whenever police question a person 
suspected of having committed a crime.62 Others have asserted that 
detention occurs only when this suspicion is “crystallized”, i.e., when 
police intend to charge the suspect and conduct the interview to obtain 
self-incriminating evidence.63 Most courts, however, have concluded 
that no single factor is determinative.64 On this approach, all of the 
circumstances must be considered in deciding whether a suspect 
reasonably concluded that cooperation with police was mandatory.65 The 
leading case is the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Moran,66 where 
Justice Martin set out the following list of relevant factors: 
1. The precise language used by the police officer in requesting the 
person who subsequently becomes an accused to come to the police 
station, and whether the accused was given a choice or expressed 
a preference that the interview be conducted at the police station, 
rather than at his or her home; 
2. whether the accused was escorted to the police station by a police 
officer or came himself or herself in response to a police request; 
3. whether the accused left at the conclusion of the interview or 
whether he or she was arrested; 
4. the stage of the investigation, that is, whether the questioning was 
part of the general investigation of a crime or possible crime or 
whether the police had already decided that a crime had been 
committed and that the accused was the perpetrator or involved in 
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 See, e.g., Gaudette c. R., [2006] J.Q. no 8112, 2006 QCCA 1004, at para. 35 (Que. C.A.); 
R. v. Voss, [1989] O.J. No. 1124, 50 C.C.C. (3d) 58, at 73 (Ont. C.A.). 
62
 See R. v. Mickey, [1988] B.C.J. No. 2585, 46 C.C.C. (3d) 278 (B.C.C.A.). 
63
 See R. v. Hawkins, [1992] N.J. No. 174, 14 C.R. (4th) 286 (Nfld. C.A.), revd [1993] 
S.C.J. No. 50, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.).  
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 See R. v. Johns, [1998] O.J. No. 445, 14 C.R. (5th) 302, at para. 23 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. 
Caputo, [1997] O.J. No. 857, 114 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 11 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. H. (C.R.), [2003] M.J. No. 90, 
174 C.C.C. (3d) 67, at paras. 27-30 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Amyot, [1990] J.Q. no 1061, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 312 
(Que. C.A.); R. v. V. (T.A.), [2001] A.J. No. 1679, 48 C.R. (5th) 366, at para. 18 (Alta. C.A.); 
Gaudette c. R., [2006] J.Q. no 8112, 2006 QCCA 1004, at para. 37 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Ancelet, 
[1986] A.J. No. 426, 70 A.R. 263 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. C. (S.), [1989] N.J. No. 81, 74 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 
252 (Nfld. C.A.). 
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 See R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at 258-59 (Ont. C.A.), leave 
to appeal refused [1988] 1 S.C.R. xi (S.C.C.).  
66
 R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.). 
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its commission and the questioning was conducted for the purpose 
of obtaining incriminating statements from the accused; 
5. whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
that the accused had committed the crime being investigated; 
6. the nature of the questions: whether they were questions of a general 
nature designed to obtain information or whether the accused was 
confronted with evidence pointing to his or her guilt; 
7. the subjective belief by an accused that he or she is detained, 
although relevant, is not decisive, because the issue is whether he 
or she reasonably believed that he or she was detained. Personal 
circumstances relating to the accused, such as low intelligence, 
emotional disturbance, youth and lack of sophistication are 
circumstances to be considered in determining whether he had a 
subjective belief that he was detained.67 
Though the Supreme Court has yet to issue a detailed opinion on the 
question, it appears to favour the Moran approach.68 
This is unfortunate. Moran69 does not provide sufficient guidance  
to police, who must often make quick decisions in pressure-filled 
environments.70 There are too many factors to consider and no one factor is 
determinative. Like other ex post facto, “totality of the circumstances” 
tests, Moran is likely to produce too many errors. Fearing that a court 
will later determine that a detention arose, police may issue the section 
10 warning when it was not required. In some of these cases, evidence 
that would have been acquired in the absence of the warning (such as a 
confession) will not be discovered, potentially thwarting the conviction 
of factually guilty suspects. Innocent suspects may also be detained for 
an unnecessarily lengthy period of time and suffer the stigma and anxiety 
associated with criminal accusation. In other cases, conversely, police 
will incorrectly decide not to issue the caution. As a result, suspects may 
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 R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at 258-59 (Ont. C.A.). Some courts 
have held that another factor to consider is whether the police have made a clear and unequivocal 
statement that the suspect is not under arrest or detention. See R. v. Rajaratnam, [2006] A.J. No. 1373, 
at para. 14 (Alta. C.A.). 
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 I glean this from the Court’s two-sentence, fact-based reversal of the Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal in R. v. Hawkins, [1992] N.J. No. 147, 14 C.R. (4th) 55 (Nfld. C.A.), revd [1993] 
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[1988] O.J. No. 957, 64 C.R. (3d) 68 (Ont. C.A.). 
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 R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.). 
70
 See David M. Tanovich, “Elshaw ― Rethinking the Meaning of Detention: The Doctrine 
of ‘Preliminary Investigatory Detention’ Is Not Appropriate” (1992) 7 C.R. (4th) 374, at 380. 
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be subjected to abusive questioning, unreliable confessions may be 
admitted (perhaps leading to the conviction of the factually innocent) 
and reliable evidence may be excluded (perhaps leading to the acquittal 
of the factually guilty). 
Moran71 also trades too heavily on the concept of voluntariness. The 
application of section 10 of the Charter should not turn on whether a 
suspect (reasonably or unreasonably) believes that compliance with the 
authorities is mandatory. It is likely that many people approached by 
police and asked to answer a few general questions believe that they have 
a legal obligation to (at least) stop and listen. As mentioned, it would be 
counterproductive to warn such persons of the right to counsel. Conversely, 
at least some people subjected to prolonged, intense questioning know 
(without being told) that they are free to remain silent and walk away. As 
discussed, however, issuing the section 10(b) caution in such circumstances 
may help to minimize the potential for abuse and false confessions.72 
The test for non-legal, psychological detention under section 10 should 
thus accomplish two objectives. First, it should set out a bright-line,  
ex ante rule telling police when they must comply with section 10.
73
 
And second, it should ensure that the protections of section 10 are given 
to people who really need them, while avoiding any undue burden on 
police in conducting general investigative questioning. 
These goals are best achieved by requiring compliance with section 
10 only when police identify a suspect as a likely perpetrator and attempt 
to elicit incriminating statements.74 It is these suspects who need the 
protection that the right to counsel provides. Requiring police to warn 
anyone they suspect of criminal activity, in contrast, casts the net too 
wide. It could require police to caution anyone they remotely suspect of 
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 R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.). 
72
 See Aman S. Patel, “Detention and Articulable Cause: Arbitrariness and Growing 
Judicial Deference to Police Judgment (2001) 45 Crim. L.Q. 198, at 214-15. 
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 Alan D. Gold, “Perspectives on Section 10(b): The Right to Counsel under the Charter” 
(1993) 22 C.R. (4th) 370. 
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 This is essentially the test proposed by the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in R. v. Hawkins, 
[1992] N.J. No. 147, 14 C.R. (4th) 55 (Nfld. C.A.), revd [1993] S.C.J. No. 50, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 157 
(S.C.C.). But I would omit from the test any reference to the intention of police to arrest or charge 
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them at that time. See also David M. Tanovich, “Elshaw — Rethinking the Meaning of Detention: 
The Doctrine of ‘Preliminary Investigatory Detention’ is not Appropriate” (1992) 7 C.R. (4th) 374; 
Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson 
Carswell, 2005), at 326-27; Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law, 2d ed., looseleaf 
(Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005- ), at § 5.3(c)(ii). The test proposed is also very similar to that used in 
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v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) right to counsel. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
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wrongdoing. This could prevent them from obtaining valuable information 
and evidence when there is little danger of abuse. 
The test I have proposed is far from perfect. It will sometimes be 
difficult (for both police and courts) to decide whether someone is a 
“likely perpetrator” or whether the main purpose of the inquiry is to 
elicit incriminating evidence. While the subjective state of mind of both 
the suspect and the police may be relevant, ultimately the question must 
be approached objectively: would the reasonable observer conclude that 
the questioning was akin to a “custodial interrogation”, i.e., questioning 
designed to elicit incriminating statements from the likely perpetrator?75 
Many of the factors listed in Moran76 will be germane to this inquiry. 
But by focusing on the degree of suspicion attaching to the suspect and 
the nature of the questioning, it should be easier to determine whether 
the section 10 caution should be (or should have been) given.77 The test 
should also do a better job than Moran of fulfilling the chief purposes of 
section 10: preventing abusive interrogations and false confessions. 
3. Physical Restraint 
As noted in Therens78 and Thomsen,79 persons subject to any kind  
of physical restraint are detained within the meaning of section 10 of  
the Charter. In some situations, however, they may not be entitled to the 
right to counsel under section 10(b). This issue typically arises in the 
context of investigative detention. Drawing on the Ontario Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Simpson,80 in Mann81 the Supreme Court of Canada 
recognized a common law power to detain persons on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion. This power allows police to briefly detain suspects 
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 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, at 323 (1994) (“the initial determination of 
custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views 
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 R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.). 
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 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). 
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 R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.). 
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 R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 12 O.R. (3d) 182 (Ont. C.A.). 
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 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.). 
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for questioning and conduct pat-down searches for weapons. The Court 
expressly declined to decide, however, whether persons subject to 
investigative detention must be warned of their right to counsel.82 
It must be stressed, however, that before there can be an investigative 
detention there must be a detention. Following the Supreme Court’s 
categorization scheme, an investigative detention can thus arise in only 
three circumstances: (i) when police physically restrain a suspect  
(e.g., by performing a frisk search83 or using force to prevent escape); 
(ii) when there is legal liability for non-compliance (e.g., failing to heed 
a police order to stop a vehicle); or (iii) when the test for non-legal 
psychological restraint is met (i.e., where the suspect reasonably believes 
that compliance is mandatory, or, as I have proposed, where police have 
identified the suspect as the likely perpetrator and initiate questioning 
with a view to eliciting incriminating statements). If none of these 
circumstances is present, there is no detention (“investigative” or otherwise) 
and police need not comply with any aspect of section 10 of the Charter. 
If one of these circumstances is present, and the situation otherwise 
fulfils the requirements of a lawful investigative detention, the question 
becomes whether there is any reason to relieve the police of their usual 
responsibility to comply with section 10(b). In the case of non-legal 
psychological detention, the answer should be an emphatic “no”. Since 
the test for this form of detention (however conceived) is designed  
to single out situations in which the benefits of conferring the right to 
counsel outweigh the costs, there can be no justification for failing to 
issue and implement the section 10(b) caution. Indeed, as detailed below, 
the kind of questioning triggering a finding of non-legal psychological 
detention will usually be incompatible with the exercise of the investigative 
detention power. Prolonged, custodial interrogations of persons identified 
as likely perpetrators should be found to exceed the limits of investigative 
detention, which is intended to be brief and relatively non-intrusive. 
Questioning of this kind should proceed only under the auspices of 
                                                                                                            
82
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 22 (S.C.C.). The Court 
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 See R. v. Debot, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at 1146 (S.C.C.); R. v. V. (T.A.), 
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(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) TRIGGERING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 287 
voluntary cooperation84 or arrest. In either case, suspects should be 
informed of their rights under section 10(b) of the Charter. 
The circumstances are very different, however, for investigative 
detentions based on physical or legal psychological restraint. In practice, 
these types of detention usually arise when pedestrians are detained 
during incidental searches or drivers are stopped for reasons other than 
the investigation of motor vehicle offences.85 Since these intrusions 
obviously constitute section 10 detentions,86 one would have thought 
that the question would be whether failing to afford the right to counsel 
is justified under section 1 of the Charter. As in the roadside screening 
and customs contexts, there is little danger of abuse or false confessions 
when police question suspects in the course of a brief investigative 
detention.87 The chief effect of affording the right to counsel in these 
circumstances would be to prolong the length and intrusiveness of 
detentions and diminish law enforcement effectiveness.88 It would thus 
not be difficult to justify the denial of this right under section 1. 
As yet there is a paucity of authority on this question.89 But in the 
leading case, Suberu,90 the Ontario Court of Appeal surprisingly declined 
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to consider section 1. Instead, Doherty J.A. held that the reference to 
“without delay” in section 10(b) contemplated a “brief interlude” between 
the initial investigative detention and the point at which police must 
advise suspects of the right to counsel.91 During this period, police may 
make “a quick assessment of the situation to decide whether anything 
more than a brief detention of the individual may be warranted”.92 
Justice Doherty elaborated as follows: 
 The police activity during the brief interlude contemplated by the 
words “without delay” must be truly exploratory in that the officer 
must be trying to decide whether anything beyond a brief detention of 
the person will be necessary and justified. If the officer has already 
made up his or her mind that the detained person will be detained for 
something more than a brief interval, there is no justification for not 
providing the individual with his or her right to counsel immediately.93 
On this view, investigation detentions may consist of two phases. In 
the first, police have a brief opportunity to assess whether a further (less 
brief) detention is warranted. During this period, the suspect’s right to 
counsel is held in abeyance. If police decide that there is no basis to 
continue the detention, the suspect must presumably be set free. If  
continued detention is warranted, then before making further inquiries 
police must warn the suspect of the right to counsel and facilitate access 
to counsel if the right is invoked. 
This is surely a strained reading of “without delay”.94 It will also 
likely have unfortunate effects when applied by police on the ground. 
Fearing that a court would later find that they overestimated the length 
of the “brief interlude”, many police officers are likely to caution 
suspects almost immediately after detention. This will prolong the 
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detention of the innocent and make it more difficult to obtain reliable, 
incriminating evidence from the guilty. As the Supreme Court noted in 
Mann95 (in a passage cited by Doherty J. in Suberu96), mandatory 
compliance with section 10(b)’s requirements “cannot be transformed 
into an excuse for prolonging, unduly and artificially, a detention that 
. . . must be of brief duration”.97 The investigative detention power must 
not, in other words, become “a de facto arrest”.98 The Court of Appeal’s 
approach, however, would have precisely this effect.99 Further, it would 
permit the prolonged detention of suspects on the basis of a standard 
(reasonable suspicion) that is markedly lower than the grounds required 
for arrest (reasonable and probable grounds). 
The better approach is to justify the denial of the right to counsel for 
the duration of investigative detentions under section 1 of the Charter.100 
This will help to keep such detentions brief and allow police to conduct 
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preliminary questioning in situations where the risk of abuse is low. 
This does not mean, of course, that the right to counsel will never apply 
to suspects who are not arrested. As discussed, when police identify a 
person who was initially subject to investigative detention as the likely 
perpetrator and initiate questioning with a view to eliciting incriminating 
statements, they must comply with section 10(b) regardless of whether 
or when they make an arrest. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation, and especially 
Charter interpretation, is now deeply entrenched in Canadian law. As a 
result, the outcome of the interpretive enterprise often hinges on the 
court’s characterization of the law’s objective. The main purpose of the 
right to counsel in section 10(b) of the Charter, as the Supreme Court of 
Canada sees it, is to protect criminal suspects against self-incrimination. 
Informing detainees of their right to talk to a lawyer, the Court believes, 
will help to prevent them from being unfairly taken advantage of by the 
state’s powerful law enforcement machinery. 
This interpretation of section 10(b) is largely mistaken. Informing 
suspects of their right to counsel is a roundabout and often ineffectual 
way of preventing self-incrimination. Section 10(b) is better understood, 
like the Miranda101 rule that inspired it, as a prophylactic against abusive 
interrogation methods (some of which are apt to produce false confessions 
and wrongful convictions). It by no means serves as a guarantee against 
these harms. But in concert with other prophylactics (such as the 
confession rule), it can help to minimize them while still allowing police 
a reasonable measure of access to reliable, self-incriminating evidence. 
With these ends in mind, I have proposed two modest reforms to the 
law on the application of section 10(b) of the Charter. First, the test for 
non-legal psychological restraint should be simplified to find detention 
only when police identify a suspect as the likely perpetrator and attempt 
to elicit incriminating statements. As compared with the prevailing 
“totality of the circumstances” approach, this test is easier for police to 
understand ex ante, easier for courts to apply ex post, and achieves a 
more optimal accommodation between the interests of suspects and law 
enforcement. Second, the courts should clarify that, in the vast majority 
of circumstances, police do not have to comply with section 10(b) at any 
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point during an investigative detention (because the infringement of the 
right to counsel is justified under section 1 of the Charter). At the same 
time, they should confirm that investigative detentions must be brief and 
limited to preliminary inquiries only. 
 
 
